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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT EXIST
CONCERNING WHETHER GRAND COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM
ENFORCING ITS SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE.

Grand County, in its Brief of Appellee, argues that Mr.
Rogers "presented no genuine issues of material facts which would
preclude summary judgment."

See Brief of Appellee, p. 5.

record on appeal, as specifically
otherwise.

set forth below,

The

indicates

In the course of rendering its unpublished decision,

the court of appeals not only failed to consider various genuine
issues of material fact but it failed to view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to
Mr. Rogers, who was the nonmoving party.
The Grand County Recorder, in the instant case, accepted and
recorded

each

document

utilized

to memorialize

the

sale

and

conveyance of properties by Mr. Rogers to various third parties
(See R. 3 6-39, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, %9) .x
acknowledges

accepting

and recording

Grand County

the previously

mentioned

documents (See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-4).

By accepting and

recording the various instruments, Grand County performed acts

l

See

R. 18-21.
5

that are

inconsistent

with its subsequent

enforcement

of the

subdivision ordinance.
In its Brief, Grand County asserts that the mere recordation
of instruments by the County Recorder does not constitute estoppel
or waiver.

See Brief of Appellee, p. 6-7.

The record, however,

reveals that this is not a mere recordation case.

Not only did

the County Recorder accept and duly record each of the instruments
but it reported and transmitted the conveyances to other County
agencies, which is consistent with the Recorder's statutory duty
to report changes in ownership where only a part of the property
is conveyed and then transmit a legal description of the portion
of the property retained.

See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995).

Presumably, the Grand County Recorder reported and transmitted the
change-in-ownership and partial-conveyance information to other
agencies when Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the parcels of property
to the various third-party property owners.
In the course of addressing the recordation issue, the court
of appeals, in its unpublished decision, concluded that "[t]he
recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes and
is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances . .
.

."

See Grand

County

v.

Rogers,

2000 UT App 162, pp. 1-2.

Nowhere in its decision did the court of appeals' discuss or
analyze the aforementioned statutory duty of the County Recorder
6

to index deeds and other instruments "partitioning or affecting
the title to or possession of real property"

as well as the

grantors and grantees of such as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 1721-6(1) (b) & (c) (1995) . Moreover, the court of appeals failed to
consider that the County Recorder, as previously discussed, is
required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995) to report changes in
ownership

"where

only

a

part

of

the

grantor's

property

is

currently conveyed" and then "transmit an additional form showing
a full legal description of the portion retained."
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments,
each of the parties to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the
subject

properties

possessed

and

made

extensive

valuable

improvements to their individual parcels of property (See R. 3639, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, flO).

In fact, each of the third

parties obtained a building permit for their improvements, which
means

that

an

official

from

the

County,

in

each

instance,

personally inspected either the actual parcel of property or the
building plans of the respective individual third-party property
owner prior to issuing each building permit.

At oral argument

before the court of appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged
that it issued building permits to the buyers of Mr. Rogers'
property over the course of several years.
refute this in its Brief before this Court.
7

Grand County does not

The application of equitable estoppel to the instant case is
particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County waited over five
years after the sale of the first parcel of property by Mr. Rogers
to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year and a half after the last
sale to file a Complaint, alleging that Mr. Rogers had failed to
properly subdivide the subject property prior to selling the same
to third parties (See R. 1-4, Complaint).

Moreover, application

of estoppel is especially appropriate in the instant case inasmuch
as this is not

a case where the party claiming estoppel acted

fraudulently, in bad faith, or with knowledge.
Young,

615 P.2d

Adjustment

of

Salt

1265, 1267
Lake

City,

(Utah 1980);

See

Xanthos

Utah County
v.

Board

v.
of

685 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1984).

In the* course of rendering its decision, the court of appeals
also failed to view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Mr. Rogers as the

nonmoving party.

See Trethway

12, f2, 995 P.2d 599; Higgins

233

(Utah

Specialists,

1993) ; see
Inc.

v.

also

Mountain

v. Miracle
v.

Salt

Estate
States

Lake

Mortgage,
County,

Landscape
Tel.

& Tel.

Inc.,

2000 UT

855 P.2d 231,

& Snow
Co.,

Removal
844 P.2d

322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992) (clarifying that reviewing court should
view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party, not losing
party).

At the very least, a determination of whether estoppel

applies to the facts of the instant case requires the fact finder
8

to

consider

testimony

and

therefore

make

credibility

determinations about such testimony as it pertains to the elements

of estoppel.

See generally

Singleton

v.

Alexander,

292, 294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967); Sandberg

v.

19 Utah 2d

Klein,

576 P.2d

1291, 1292 (Utah 1978) (stating that even in cases where facts are
not in "complete conflict" but the "understanding, intention, and
consequences" of the facts are disputed, the matters "can only be
resolved by a trial").

That there exist triable issues is further

supported by Grand County's contention in its Brief that "general
law provides that waivers of subdivision controls are not to be
inferred unless

the conduct

said to constitute

a waiver was

clearly intended as such."

See Brief of Appellee, p. 7.

recognized

the

by

this

Court,

actions

or

events

As

allegedly

supporting waiver are "intensely fact dependent" and require the
fact finder to assess "the totality of the circumstances" before
making such a determination.
Loan Ass'n,
Gillespie,

Soter's

v. Deseret

Federal

857 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Utah 1993); accord

Sav.

Pledger

&
v.

1999 UT 54, 1fl6, 982 P.2d 572.

Nowhere in its unpublished decision did the court of appeals
consider the disputed material facts that the subject parcels of
property had been extensively improved or that Grand County had
substantially
ordinance.

delayed

its

enforcement

of

the

subdivision

The court of appeals' legal conclusion that Grand
9

County was not estopped is in direct conflict with this Court's
decision in Utah County

v.

Young,

615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980), where

this Court stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies
xx

when a

county

committed

an act

or

omission

upon which

the

developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes
in position or incurring extensive expenses."
Pasco

County

1978)).

v.

Tampa Dev.

Corp.,

Id.

3 64 S.2d 850

at 1267 (citing
(Fla. Ct . App.

Further, the court of appeals failed to consider that the

disputed material facts in the instant case constitute more than
mere

Young,

" [s] ilence or inaction."

615 P. 2d at 1268.

The

material facts of the instant case, when properly considered,
constitute

the exceptional

circumstances

contemplated

for the

application of estoppel against Grand County.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE ABSENT PROPERTY OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS
OF PROPERTY TO BE NECESSARY PARTIES TO BE JOINED
PRIOR TO A FULL AND FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE
INSTANT CASE.

Without any supporting citation, Grand County baldly asserts
that the lot owners of the subject property are not indispensable
parties.2

See Brief of Appellee, p. 8.

2

For the reasons detailed

Grand County asserts that the absent third parties "cannot
get building permits under current conditions . . . , and they
cannot have the benefits of subdivision improvements, which may
be required . . . ." See Brief of Appellee, p. 8. As previously
discussed, the third-party property owners have already obtained
building permits and have already made substantial and valuable
10

in the previously filed Brief of Petitioner as well as that below,
the court of appeals misinterpreted Rule 19, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and erroneously concluded that the third-party
buyers are not necessary parties.
The court of appeals failed to consider Mr. Rogers' arguments
that according to Rule 19(a) (1), the property owners to whom Mr.
Rogers sold various parcels of the subject property are necessary
parties to the litigation because in their absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties.
Lake

City,

11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d

631, 637

Cf.

Stone

(1960)

v. Salt
(holding

"grantees of deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be
necessary parties).

From 1994 through 1997, Mr. Rogers sold and

conveyed various parcels of the subject property to bona fide
third parties (See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-5; R.
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, ff8-10).

36-39;

In light of the claims

asserted by Grand County and, more importantly, by virtue of the
district

court's judgment

that requires Mr. Rogers to obtain

subdivision approval for property that is owned by third-party
owners, the interests of the third-party property owners, who are

improvements to their individual parcels of property pursuant to
building permits previously issued by Grand County (See R. 38,
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, flO). That subdivision improvements
may be required of the absent third-party owners supports joinder
pursuant to Rule 19.
11

not parties to this action, are directly adverse to the interests
asserted
Violation
court's

by

Grand

of

County

Subdivision

judgment

(See R.

63-66,

Ordinance).

essentially

In

voids

the

Judgment
fact,

(Enjoining

the

previous

district

sales

and

conveyances by Mr. Rogers of the various parcels of the subject
property to bona fide third parties (See id.)

. The fact that the

third-party property owners are necessary is further demonstrated
by both Grand
Judgment

in

County's

which

it

Complaint
asserted

and
that

its Motion
Mr.

Rogers'

for

Summary

sales

and

conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void (See R. 3,
Complaint, %2 of the Prayer; R. 2 7-28, Amended Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
R. 41, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum

in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment).
In addition, the absent property owners are necessary parties
under Rule 19(a) (2) inasmuch as they have an interest relating to
the subject property and are so situated that the disposition of
the action in their absence may impair or impede their ability to
protect that interest.3

Bonneville

See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2); see

Tower Condominium Management

3

Comm. v.

Thompson

also

Michie

Grand County admitted that the absent third-party property
owners have an interest in the subject real property (See R. 1517, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, Hf2-5; see also R. 3 6-3 9, Affidavit of
Lester Rogers, f|8-10) .
12

Assocs.,

Inc.,

728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A plaintiff may

not obtain relief adverse to the property rights of others who are
not adverse parties to the case without bringing them before the
court.").

The district court's judgment is a judgment lien upon

the subject real property, and thus encumbers the interests of the
absent third-party property owners for purposes of enforcing the
See Utah Code Ann. §

various subdivision ordinance requirements.
78-22-1

(Supp.

requirements,

by

1999) .
virtue

Enforcement
of

the

of

the

judgment,

subdivision

are

presumably

enforceable also upon the third-party property owners without any
response or opposition by them to the enforcement.
The court of appeals all but failed to consider that the
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a
substantial

risk

of

incurring

double, multiple, or

otherwise

inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned.
19(a) (2).

See Utah R. Civ. P.

Even if Mr. Rogers could legally

comply with the

district court's order, such compliance would subject Mr. Rogers
to multiple obligations that would likely be incurred by actions
filed by the absent third-party property owners against Mr. Rogers

13

to defend their interests or otherwise shift responsibility for
assessments incurred by the subdivision ordinance requirements.4
With little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the
court

of

appeals

affirmed

the

summary

judgment

in which

the

district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties
not before the court (See R. 64, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of
Subdivision Ordinance)).
compliance
capacity

The district court ordered Mr. Rogers'

notwithstanding

or right

that

to bring

he

does

not

the previously

have

sold

the

and

legal

conveyed

parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties.
Not only did the court of appeals fail to consider the two
general factors in Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a), 5 it also ignored this
Court's decision in Bonneville

Tower,

holding that the "failure to

bring all parties before the court prevents it from properly
reaching the merits of plaintiff's claim."
P.2d at 1020.

Bonneville

Tower, 728

Finally, the court of appeals' decision conflicts

4

Grand County acknowledges in its Brief that the absent
third-party property owners "may have claims against Mr. Rogers .
. . ." See Brief of Appellee, p. 9.
5

See Landes
1990).

v.

Capital

City

Bank,

14

795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah

with Stone

v. Salt

Lake

City,

11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631 (I960),

where this Court held that "grantees of deeds, the validity of
which is under attack", are necessary parties.

Stone,

356 P.2d at

637.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED THE OCCUPYING
CLAIMANTS ACT AND FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT OR ISSUES OF LAW
EXIST IN LIGHT OF THE ACT.
Without any analysis or authority, Grand County argues that
the court of appeals correctly held that the Occupying Claimants
See Brief of Appellee, p.

Act does not apply to the instant case.
9.

For

the

reasons

detailed

below,

the

court

of

appeals

misinterpreted the Occupying Claimants Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-61, et

seq.

(1994 & Supp. 2000), in the course of concluding that

the Act does not apply in this case.
In

the

course

of

interpreting

a

statute,

this

Court's

"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."
State,

963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998).

Evans

v.

The best evidence of the

legislature's true intent and purpose in enacting a statute is the
plain language of the statute.

See State

312 (Utah 1995).
Section 57-6-1 of the Act provides:

15

v. Hunt,

906 P.2d 311,

Where an occupant of real estate has color
of title to the real estate, and in good
faith has made valuable improvements on the
real estate, and is afterwards in a proper
action found not to be the owner, no
execution shall issue to put the owner in
possession of the real estate after the
filing
of
a
complaint
as
hereinafter
provided, until the provisions of this
chapter have been complied with.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1

(Supp. 2000) .

Further, section 57-6-

4(2) (a) provides that
Any person has color of title who has
occupied a tract of real estate by himself
[or herself] , or by those under whom he [or
she] claims, for the term of five years, or
who has occupied it for less time, if he [of
she], or those under whom he [of she] claims,
have at any time during the occupancy with
the knowledge or consent, express or implied,
of
the
real
owner
made
any
valuable
improvements on the real estate, or if he [or
she] or those under whom he [or she] claims
have at any time during the occupancy paid
the ordinary county taxes on the real estate
for any one year, and two years have elapsed
without a repayment by the owner, and the
occupancy is continued up to the time at
which the action is brought by which the
recovery of the real estate is obtained.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a) (Supp. 2000)
added).

The record demonstrates

(Bracketed material

that the absent

third-party

property owners to whom Mr. Rogers sold the subject parcels of
property have occupied the subject real property and have made
valuable improvements to their respective parcels (See R. 36-39,
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, Ul6, 8, and 10) .
16

At oral argument

before

the

court

of

appeals,

Grand

County

acknowledged

the

improvements to the subject property in the course of discussing
building permits that had been issued to the property owners.
Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the court of
appeals held that the Occupying Claimants Act does not apply to
the instant case.
pp. 2-3.

See

Grand

County

v. Rogers,

2000 UT App 162,

In the course of interpreting the Act, the court of

appeals stated, "The remedy sought by the County seeks neither to
expel them nor to encumber their property in any way."

See

id.

Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, the district
court's judgment, at the very least, constructively voids the
previous

sales

and conveyances by Mr. Rogers

of

the various

parcels of the subject property to bona fide third parties.

This

is consistent with both Grand County's Complaint and its Motion
for Summary Judgment in which it asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales
and conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void (See
R. 3, Complaint, f2 of the Prayer; R. 2 7-28, Amended Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
R. 41, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum
Summary Judgment).
as a judgment

in Support of Motion for

Moreover, the district court's judgment acts

lien upon the subject

real property, and thus

encumbers the interests of all the absent third-party property

17

owners for purposes of enforcing the various subdivision ordinance
requirements.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (Supp. 1999) .

In the course of its interpretation, the court of appeals
failed to consider both the plain language of the Act and the
genuine issues of disputed material facts under which the absent
third-party property owners and Mr. Rogers occupy the subject
property and thereby have color of title as against Grand County.
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4 (Supp. 2000).

Finally, in light of

the interests of the occupying claimants in this case, material
issues exist concerning the remedies that the property owners are
entitled to in light of the competing interests asserted by Grand
County in this action and whether the zoning and
ordinances

of

the

County

take precedence

over

subdivision

the

interests

provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seg. (1994 & Supp.
2000).

See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) (providing remedy for

parties to hold property as tenants in common).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that previously submitted
in the Brief of Petitioner, Mr. Rogers respectfully asks that this
Court reverse the court of appeals' unpublished decision in which
it affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor

of

Grand

County

and

remand

18

the case

for trial

on the

existing genuine issues of disputed material fact and issues of
law and for any other relief the Court deems appropriate under the
circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of May, 2001.
WIGGINS, P . C .

y^~J
Wihgms
Attorn^ys^tor P e t i t i o n e r /
AppeTTmit
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER to
the following on the 7th day of May, 2001:
Mr. W. Scott Barrett
Barrett & Daines
108 North Main^—Suite
Logan, Utah-
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ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(11).
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